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  Introduction 
 Democracy promotion through military intervention often fails and target countries are 
frequently plunged into violent civil wars that can last for years. Leading alternative theories 
suggest inadequate nation building and cultural incompatibility are the root cause of failed 
interventions. However, the failed attempts to convert regimes into democratic systems of 
government is best explained by Modernization Theory. Modernization theorists contend that 
economic development is a prerequisite for successful democratization, rather than nation 
building or a cultural incompatibility. The principles of nation building and cultural 
incompatibility are often shallow, with ethnocentric viewpoints and lack of a holistic view of the 
intricacies of society. Alternatively, modernization theory provides depth to the subject that is 
frequently lacking, taking into account a society’s history, culture, and current economic 
development. The implications of modernization theory accurately being able to provide a clear 
picture of a country’s ability to support a democracy means that for policy makers, careful 
evaluation of emerging international security crises can be made before any official action is 
taken. Other policy prescriptions, such as sanctions or negotiations can be suggested first. 
Having a clearer picture of a country’s capability to convert to democracy may help policy 
makers avoid costly and possibly fruitless interventions that end in a worsening humanitarian 
crisis.  
Literature Review 
Failure of Nation Building 
 The successful rebuilding of Germany and Japan after WW II are habitually paraded as 
examples that, with enough time and effort, military interventions can lead to functioning 
democracies. The United States spent roughly $29.3 billion in 2005 USD on rebuilding Germany 
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(Serafino et al. 3). Nearly all of the aid starting in 1945 to Germany for the first three years went 
to humanitarian relief. The implementation of the Marshall plan in 1948 targeted the economic 
sector.  In contrast, the U.S. only spent $15.2 billion 2005 USD on Japan with 40% of the aid 
going to economic recovery (Serafino et al. 3). Both Germany and Japan were able to recover 
from the destruction of the war and emerge as democratic societies. The idea that enough 
financial assistance can turn any society into a democracy over a short period of time is 
immediately contradicted by the Iraq war. By 2005 Iraq had received $28.9 billion in financial 
assistance with 40% of the money focusing on the country’s infrastructure. This figure reached 
nearly $60 billion by 2013, about double the money provided to Germany with none of the same 
results (CBSnews.com, “$60B”). The inability of Iraq to convert to democracy highlights that 
there are compounding issues beyond economic funding.  
Cultural Incompatibility  
 Since democracy is rarely found in non-western countries, there is a common assumption 
that democracy is not compatible with Eastern cultures (Wright 144). However, Japan an Eastern 
country, managed to transition to democracy after World War II. Their success provides 
credence to the idea that eastern cultures can sustain a democracy. Furthermore, other cultures 
that are also often disparaged as unable to support democracy, are Islamic and Arabic cultures. 
Many Islamic leaders have publicly disagreed with western democracy, and the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 in which the Iranian people rose up against the Sha’s deliberate Western 
modernization of Iran, is often cited as evidence to support this idea (Esposito and Piscatori 434). 
However, much of this explanation can be discounted as ethnocentrism and misunderstanding of 
Islamic culture. Many Islamic philosophers insist that Islam is compatible with democracy, 
though it may not be the exact form of democracy employed by Western societies (Ehteshami 
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94). The leaders of the En-Nahda Movement, Rashid Ghannoushi and Abdelfattah Mourou, have 
worked together to combine Islam with democracy, stating “…the state is not something from 
God but from the people…The state has to serve the benefit of the Muslims…” (qtd. In Esposito 
and Piscatori 3) and Mourou specified, “…laws come from God, but sovereignty is that of the 
people” (qtd. In Esposito and Piscatori 3). Ghannoushi and Mourou are working together to 
propose a softer version of Islam. One that encompasses all of the basic principles and secular 
values of the people to create a version of democracy that coincides with Islamic culture instead 
of against it(Esposito and Piscatori 3). Ghannoushi also contends that the West operates from a 
point of ethnocentrism, “While the West criticizes Islamic governments for not being 
democratic, it also supports governments who are not democratic and are keeping Islamic 
movements from developing their ideas” (qtd. In Esposito and Piscatori 3). This is further 
highlighted by the situation that occurred in Algeria in 1990. After the end of the one party 
system in Algeria, the first multiparty election was held where the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
won the election by 60% (Wright 134). The FIS had worked in Algeria to improve the basic 
living conditions of the people, including cleaning up garbage that had built up during a strike by 
trash collectors. The transition towards a more democratic government also included the creation 
of a parliament.  The FIS performed well during the parliament elections in 1991 holding almost 
a majority of the seats. This made the FIS the first Islamic party since the Iranian revolution to 
win an election (Wright 135). However, their victory was short-lived as Defense Minister Khaled 
Nezzar led what was later called the ‘white coup’ and forced the FIS out of power and suspended 
all elections. The FIS member and supporters found themselves forced into detention camps in 
the Sahara Desert (Wright 135). With democracy failing in Algeria, the United States made very 
little comment on the situation. Proving that there was in fact, an issue with Islamists in power, 
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even in a democratic government. In addition to little Western media response, the new leaders 
that staged the coup were hosted by several Western countries to explain their plans going 
forward and financial assistance was provided by a coalition of banks (Wright 137). Islamist 
group leaders felt these actions sent a clear message to the Middle East that Western countries 
only want to uphold democracy when it is in their best interest (Wright 137).  
Theory 
Modernization Theory  
 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel combined the essential ideas of modernization 
theory with “…socioeconomic development, cultural change and democratization…” in the 
context of human development (Inglehart et al. 1). There are four main points that can be 
distilled from their work:  
• Societies develop along a semi-predictable path shaped by the culture of the 
region. 
• Culture persists throughout socioeconomic development.  
• Homogenous societies are more stable. 
• Generational changes occur slowly. 
 
Societies tend to develop on a similar path, from pre-industrial to postindustrial (Inglehart 
et al. 46). Each stage of development brings predictable changes to the society. Industrialization 
provides a shift from traditional to secular values. Post-industrialization affects survival and self-
expression values (Inglehart et al. 74). Post-industrial societies tend to highly value self-
expression. Increased self-expression means that citizens devote less time to food security and 
begin to explore personal identity. Inglehart and Welzel discovered that culture reemerges as 
self-expression. Additionally, people choose to define themselves through their national heritage. 
At this point in societal development, behaviors change. The criteria of what constitutes a good 
life changes, people begin to seek a higher quality of life experience rather than a quantity of 
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basic commodities (Inglehart et al. 25). When citizens with high self-expression values become 
disappointed with their situation, they have the confidence necessary to start mass political 
movements (Inglehart et al. 120). Culture is usually tied together with political movements and 
will diversify the governmental structure.  
Furthermore, since culture can influence government structure, cultures without ethnic 
divisions tend to be more stable during regime transitions. In heterogeneous societies, ethnic 
differences are often exploited by those attempting to gain power and it is harder for citizens to 
identify with a collective identity. Democracy builds its foundation in the idea that citizens are 
equal and unified by a central cultural identity; however, simply having the same citizenship is 
not enough to override long standing ethical divisions (Inglehart et al. 205). 
Lastly, societal changes happen slowly. Each generation establishes its value system by 
adulthood (Inglehart et al. 113). Generational changes are only expressed in societies in 
“…which younger generations have experienced substantially different formative conditions 
from those that shaped older generations” (Inglehart et al. 113). Societies that are experiencing 
economic stagnation will demonstrate little to no change in the self-expression of younger 
generations. Not all societies will develop at the same rate and several generations can pass with 
no change to self-expression values. 
Definition of a Developed Country 
 Daniel Bell’s theory of post-industrialization contains three main assertions: 
• Movement from a manufacturing based economy to a service based economy (14) 
• Centrality of science and knowledge based industries (18) 
• Shift to technology (29) 
 
 Indicators most closely related to Daniel Bell’s framework were selected for analysis: 
High Technology Exports as percentage of Manufactured Exports, GNI per capita Atlas Method, 
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Manufacturing percent of GDP, Services percent of GDP and Inequality-adjusted Human 
Development Index.  
 Daniel Bell’s theory of post-industrialization places heavy emphasis on the shift towards 
science in the economy and society. The High Technology Exports as a percentage of 
Manufactured Exports indicator was selected to represent technology in a society due to it having 
the most complete data set for the world, out of all the science indicators that were considered.1 
GNI per capita Atlas Method is used as a general inquiry into a country’s economy and what the 
average citizen makes. Manufacturing percent of GDP and Services percent of GDP were 
selected to compare if the economy is more industrial or serviced based. Bell’s theory states that 
countries will move towards a more service based economy when they reach post-
industrialization. Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index adds a general overall 
assessment of the humanitarian conditions of a country. The Inequality-adjusted Human 
Development Index is created based on life expectancy, per capita income and education; this 
statistic is then adjusted to account for inequality found within the country through the Atkinson 
measure of inequality (Santos 12; HDR.undp.org).  
 For the purposes of this paper the medians and other related statistics for each indicator 
were established from the list of developed countries provided by the World Bank 
(Worldbank.org; Un.org).2 Within the context of this paper the target country’s statistics should 
                                                          
1 The indicators of Researchers in R&D (per million people) and technicians in R&D (per million people) might be 
better suited to explain this phenomenon but the data sets were grossly incomplete.  
2 The World Bank has established four different economic groups; low, middle, upper middle and high income, and 
assigned numerical values to each based originally on GNP, and now on GNI. The original 1986 staff report lists the 
following values (numbers adjusted for 2017 inflation values): Low-income, below $914.81, Lower-Middle Income 
$916.97-1,797.34, Upper Middle Income $1799.49-3,725.00. Countries with GNP of higher than $12,915.00 is 
considered a High-income county. Though these figures alone are not the only determining factors, as high-income 
GNP oil export countries are not necessarily recognized as developed.   
 However, as to not deviate too far outside of the general accepted classifications because challenging the 
classifications is not the main goal of this paper, the framework I propose and use to evaluate my cases is built from 
data extracted from the World Bank on countries that are accepted as developed. 
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fall within these ranges to be considered a developed country. A developing country should 
possess some of the criteria, or fall within a few standard deviations.  
Methodology 
 For this study we will be employing a most similar system design (MSSD) for examining 
the regime changes experienced in Tunisia and Libya during the Arab Spring in 2011. MSSD 
was selected for analysis because in using cases with the most similar geography, ethnic 
background and history of authoritarianism, assists in isolating the underlying variable that 
causes intervention to fail in promoting democracy in target countries. Tunisia and Libya were 
selected for exploration due to being located in the same geographical location in Africa and for 
possessing much of the same developmental history; even though they may differ in modern 
ethnic composition. The main difference between the two cases is that there was NATO 
intervention in Libya while Tunisia carried out their revolution without any outside intervening 
forces. The main analysis will look to see if modernization theory can explain why Tunisia 
transitioned to democracy while Libya, even with assistance, failed to do so and if intervention is 
the reason the country failed to stabilize and has been embroiled in civil war ever since.  
The first cases will compare and contrast: historical timelines, modern pre-revolution 
political structure, population demographics, revolution timelines, and discuss specific elements 
of each revolution to provide a holistic framework for theory application in the following 
section. The second section, analysis, will apply Ingelhart and Welzel’s modernization theory to 
each case to determine if the theory can explain why foreign intervention alone often fails to 
produce democratic regimes. Each defining factor as developed in the previous theory section: 
socioeconomic development, persistence of culture, generational value changes and homogenous 
societies, will be applied to each case for examination. Additionally, a framework developed 
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from Daniel Bell’s theory on post-industrial economies and the global development data from 
the World Bank will be used to provide social science driven statistical relevance to the 
qualitative assessment of each case. Lastly, the final section of the paper, implications, will 
discuss the general consequences of the findings of analysis, discuss the conclusions, and 
relevance to policy makers and the international security community.  
Cases 
Tunisian History  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of Tunisian History 
Tunisia is located at the northern tip of Africa. During times of antiquity, it was founded 
by nomadic peoples, the ancestors of the modern-day Berber tribes (BBC.com). During the 7th 
and 8th centuries the region was conquered by Arab Muslims (BBC.com). The Arab leaders of 
Tunisia built up the region and founded the Aghlabid Dynasty. Eventually the Arabs left the 
region to the Berbers. Over the Centuries, Tunisia was invaded continuously from surrounding 
countries, including the Ottoman empire. Tunsiua’s future looked bleak as it was under Turkish 
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rule, until Tunisian debt became so unsurmountable that the government declared bankruptcy, a 
few years later the French invaded. Tunisia was declared a French protectorate until they 
declared their independence in 1956.  
Political Structure of Tunisia Pre-Revolution 
 From 1959 until 2011, Tunisia was recognized as a republic with an elected presidential 
leader. The system consisted of a president, prime minister, unicameral legislation and a 
Chamber of Deputies (Perkins 131-156). All of these changes were orchestrated by the first 
president, Habib Bourguiba, who in reality had created a ‘presidential monarchy’(Perkins 133). 
Bourguiba would serve for life, as he banned and exiled all oppositional forces. However, in 
1987, Ben Ali, the prime minister, replaced Bougubia after he was pronounced medically 
incapacitated. Although, while oppositional parties were legalized in 1981 by Bourgubia in an 
attempt to ease political tensions, Ben Ali never lost an election and served as president until 
2011 (Perkins 167; 185-211). 
Tunisian Demographics 
 Most citizens are of Arabic decent with about 2% of the population being made up of 
European and Jewish decent (Tunisia). The religious makeup of the country is also essentially 
homogenous, 99.1% of individuals belonging to the Muslim faith and 1% of the population to all 
others (Tunisia). The main languages spoken are Arabic, French and Berber (Tunisia). In 2010, 
more than 55% of Tunisians were less than 30 years old (Murphy 302).  
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Tunisian Revolution Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Tunisian Revolution Timeline 
The Tunisia revolution started in response to the death of Mohamed Bouazizi. Bouazizi 
was a street merchant who had his license to sell confiscated and then was beaten by the police. 
In response, Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest. Nation-wide protests erupted during 
December 2010 and January 2011 in response to his death (Chomiak 70). Bouazizi’s struggle 
represented to many people in Tunisia the corruption of the government and inability to advance 
their socio-economic status. 
 To solidify his power, Ben Ali declared  all protesters as terrorists and sanctioned the use 
of brutal force by the police. Nevertheless, the protests remained peaceful, and  protesters only 
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fought back with their fists and rocks in self-defense. Advantaged citizens with cell phones used 
social media to break Tunisia’s “media cocoon”, exposing the government’s violence against 
them to the West (Esseghaier 3). Desperately, Ben Ali attempted to quell the protests by insisting 
on national television that the protests were damaging to the economy (Murphy 301). After many 
unions called for strikes, Ben Ali declared a state of emergency and established a curfew. In mid-
January, the military chief of staff disobeyed Ben Ali’s orders to fire on the protesters. The 
military withdrew troops from vital locations and placed itself between the police and the 
protestors (Murphy 302). 
 Consequently, after his attempts to quell the protests failed, Ben Ali fled the country, and 
Fouad Mebazaa, who was the speaker of parliament was declared to be the interim president 
until elections could be held (Murphy 302). Emboldened, the protesters began to push for a full 
democratic government transition with the removal of the entire ruling party. However, police 
forces still loyal to Ben Ali continued to harass the protesters. The situation remained unsteady in 
Tunisia for several years as political forces worked to steady the country. Finally, in 2014, the 
new constitution was ratified, establishing Tunisia as a parliamentary republic (Tunisia).  
Tunisian Revolution Discussion 
 An analysis of the Tunisian revolution, provides evidence that protesting and 
governmental revolution was born out of anger at the level of inequality experienced across the 
country. Wealth and infrastructure had become regionally stratified, within the coastal areas 
while most of the population lives in the rural interior (Aleya-Sghaier 20). Additionally, those 
with access to education still had no employment prospects; this united both the advantaged and 
disadvantaged (Aleya-Sghaier 21). With a common cause the people of Tunisia were able to use 
their relative position in society to contribute to the revolution. The disadvantaged took to the 
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streets; professionals held strikes and citizens with technology recorded and distributed images 
of the revolution, bringing the violence levied against protesters by the Ben Ali government to 
the world (Aleya-Sghaier 23).  
 
 
 
Libyan History  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Libyan Historical Timeline 
Similar to Tunisia, Libya shares much of the same ancient cultural background and 
conquering forces. The Italians colonized Libya after the Italo-Turkish war in 1911-1912 and 
seizing the region from the Ottomans. After World War II, Libya was under Allied Occupation 
(Tremlett 29-34). Libya gained independence in 1951, becoming the United Kingdom of Libya 
(Chronology 213-244). Ghadafi took power in 1969 through a military-led coup (Bruce St John 
92). 
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Political Structure of Libya Pre-Revolution 
 After Gadhafi assumed power, he began to transition the governmental form away from 
monarchy and toward socialism. Libya became the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya in 1977. The government maintained that the people were directly represented in the 
government through the General People’s Congress. However, the system lacked political parties 
and official representatives (Bruce St John 94). Gadhafi frequently rearranged the system to suit 
his advantage (Bruce St John 102). 
 
Libyan Demographics 
 96.6% of the population of Libya is Arab and Berber tribes, although, tribal divisions are 
still recognizable. 3% of the population is composed of Greeks, Italians, and Pakistanis. While, 
the predominant religion is Islam, 4% of the population practices Christianity, Buddhism, Hindu, 
Jewish or a native religion (Libya). The languages spoken are Arabic, Italian, English and Berber 
(Libya). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
Clayton: Military Intervention
Published by CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2019
 
 
Libyan Revolution Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Libyan Revolution Timeline 
The Libyan people joined the Arab Spring in February 2011. After watching their 
neighbor, Tunisia, successfully overturn their government, the Libyans began to call for protests 
on Facebook and Twitter. The first protests were in Benghazi. However, the protests were 
dispersed by Gadhafi’s security forces through the use of non-lethal force (Kuperman “A Model” 
9). On February 15th, protesters set fire to the police buildings in Beyida (Aljazeera.com). Once 
protesters began to fight back, Gadhafi’s security forces began to use live ammunition. In 
reprisal, the protestors caught two policemen and hung them (Mu). The protesters also reported 
to Western media that they were being slaughtered indiscriminately. In an attempt to make 
concessions, Gadhafi’s son, Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, ordered the release of 110 members of the 
Libya Islamic Fighting Group (Theguardian.com). Soon after their release, the LIFG, a group 
with known terrorist ties, took up arms and joined the protesters.  
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In March, the Arab League called for the establishment of a no fly zone over Libya 
(Chivvis 70). After the Arab League endorsed the no fly zone, NATO passed UNSCR 1973 on 
March 17th certifying a humanitarian mission (Chivvis 71). A military coalition launched air 
strikes on Gadhafi’s “…air-defense systems, forced his armored columns to retreat from the 
cities they were attacking, and established a no-fly zone over most of the country" (Chivvis 71) 
After ten days NATO took over military operations in Libya (Chivvis 74). 
In April, the United States recommitted their predator drones to the battle field (Chivvis 
77). Later that year, the coalition began to equip and train rebel forces (Chivvis 77). But it was 
not until August that the rebels were able to conquer Tripoli. It took another two months for rebel 
forces to locate Gadhafi and execute him. After the death of Gadhafi, all NATO forces pulled out 
of the region (Chivvis 78). The region has since fallen into civil war as the local tribes began 
fighting for control of the country. 
Libyan Revolution Discussion 
While both Tunisia’s and Libya’s revolutionary movements made calls for peaceful 
protests on Facebook and Twitter, that is where their similarities end. The Libyan revolution was 
a violent movement from its inception. The very first day saw the rebel groups burning police 
buildings and throwing gas bombs (Kuperman “A Model” 109). Protesters had firearms, car 
bombs, Molotov cocktails; they captured Benghazi a mere three days into the crisis (Kuperman 
“A Model” 109). To have these improvised weapons already prepared suggests that the 
protesters never intended to be peaceful. The violence and subsequent intervention in Libya 
provided other countries in the region with the motivation to take note and turn violent in an 
attempt to also attract NATO attention (Kuperman “Libya Debacle” 7).  
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Analysis 
Tunisia  
 
Tunisia Technology GNI Per Capita Manufacturing % Services %  IHDI 
4.9 4130 18.0 60.3 0.717* 
Comparison Statistics 
Minimum 4.40 7480 4.40 57.30 0.709 
Quartile 1 8.43 19783 8.73 68.50 0.7790 
Median 13.20 40365 14.30 72.15 0.815 
Mean 13.73 39044 14.58 72.28 0.81112 
Quartile 3 17.35 50720 19.45 77.33 0.8505 
Maximum 31.90 93530 31.90 87.70 0.898 
SD 6.57 21398 10.70 7.13 0.04470 
Figure 6: Tunisian Score for 2009-2010 vs. Comparison Data from Recognized Developed Countries 
* This is the 2011 HDI score; only 2015 has an inequality adjusted score. 
 
 Tunisia has a GNI below minimum, a manufacturing percentage in the third quartile and 
services just below the first quartile. The HDI score falls above the minimum. These scores fall 
in line with modernization theory; there is the demonstration of a large service sector and 
technology is present in the society. Finally, agriculture makes up 14.8% of the labor force, only 
one fourth of the service industry percentage (Tunisia). This suggests that citizens should have 
secular and self-expression values. Individuals showed signs of autonomy and willingness to 
challenge elites. Strikes by those in the service industry illustrate this point. Also, persistence of 
culture was found when the Ennahdha Party, an Islamist party, was elected after the revolution, 
the people protested (Marzouki 3). Tunisia has always had a secular government (Cesari 5). 
Throughout the revolution, Tunisia benefited from having a homogenous population. The people 
were united by their cause rather than divided by ethnicity. Lastly, the current generation was 
raised in a growing economy; GNI had been increasing steadily since 1986 (Tunisia, GNI). 
  Overall, GNI per capita shows a fairly steady increase since 1986 when Ben Ali assumed 
the presidency. In 2011, GNI per capita was at its highest and due to the mostly smooth 
transition during the revolution, there was only a slight decrease in 2011 which recovered by 
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2014. Roughly half the population in 2011 was under the age of 30, meaning these generations 
were raised in a growing economy (Murphy 302). According to modernization theory, this is 
exactly the environment required to cause the shift between survival and self-expression values 
(Inglehart et al. 43). “Rising emphasis on self-expression does not reflect the prior existence of 
democracy…it can emerge under either democratic or authoritarian institutions…it generates 
mass demands for democracy” (Inglehart et al. 8-9). It did not matter in Tunisia that the country 
had never experienced democracy before because the environment to support the transition was 
present.  
Libya  
Libya Technology GNI Per Capita Manufacturing % Services %  IHDI 
-- 12250 4.5 19.9 0.756* 
Comparison Statistics 
Minimum 4.40 7480 4.40 57.30 0.709 
Quartile 1 8.43 19783 8.73 68.50 0.7790 
Median 13.20 40365 14.30 72.15 0.815 
Mean 13.73 39044 14.58 72.28 0.81112 
Quartile 3 17.35 50720 19.45 77.33 0.8505 
Maximum 31.90 93530 31.90 87.70 0.898 
SD 6.57 21398 10.70 7.13 0.04470 
Figure 7: Libyan Scores for 2008-201** vs. Comparison Data from Recognized Developed Countries 
* This is the HDI score; there is no available data on inequality adjustments except for Life Expectancy, 
which is for 2010-2015 in relation to the civil war placing limits on life expectancy. 
** There is a scarcity of data for Libya even in 2010 before the revolution, values from the closest year to 
2010 were used to fill in the gaps. There is no High Technology exports % of GDP data from Libya in the World 
Bank online database. 
Libya’s GNI and HDI scores fall above minimum; service industry is far below minimum 
and manufacturing is nearly nonexistent. Libya is a high oil export county, these countries often 
suffer from extreme wealth stratification (Inglehart et al 45). 17% of the labor force is employed 
in the agricultural sector (Libya). There is no value for High Technology; most of Libya lacks 
access to technology.  In 2011, Libya fell within the category of pre-industrial. Pre-industrial 
citizens typically have traditional, survival, family centric values and little to no autonomy or 
self-expression values (Inglehart et al. 52). Persistence of culture is demonstrated through the 
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tribal divisions still clearly present (Lacher 146). People with traditional values in ethnically 
divided countries controlled by inflexible social constraints, such as the ones used by autocratic 
regimes, often feel insecure and are intolerant of other groups (Lacher 146). Lastly Libya has had 
very little economic growth, with GNI per capita only beginning to increase in 2004 and 
stagnating in 2008 (Libya, GNI). There would have been no driving force to push generational 
values forward.    
Comparison  
Modernization theory paints a clear picture as to why Tunisia was able to change to a 
democratic regime and Libya was not. Tunisia has a more advanced economy, where citizens are 
beginning to express themselves and have greater access to technology. Alternatively, Libyan 
citizens are still mainly concerned about their survival and have little to no technology in 
comparison (Lacher 144). Tunisia has also experienced economic growth, whereas Libya has 
stagnated. Had NATO not intervened in Libya, the country would have likely continued along its 
developmental pathway, but intervention provided an outside shock that disrupted the system. 
Gadhafi was able to recapture cities easily because the rebels were not fully equipped to defend 
for themselves, and they were concerned mainly with their immediate survival rather than 
expressing an ideal, like the protesters in Tunisia despite drawing inspiration from them.   
Additionally, statistical studies have found that there is a higher likelihood of 
democratization within one year of an intervention (Gleditsch 27). Libya attempted this by 
holding elections after the conflict, but they did not create a democracy because “…adopting 
democratic institutions does not automatically make self-expression values peoples top priority” 
(Inglehart et al. 8)  
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Implications 
 In comparison to Libya, Tunisia is a fairly simplistic case. However, it does a good job of 
illustrating the two ways to handle what some policymakers might view as an international 
security crisis. There was nothing at the time that would have warranted international 
involvement in Tunisia. The protests were peaceful and while the government was perpetrating 
violence against its citizens, the number of deaths was relatively low (Aljazeera.com “Tunisia 
Protests”). While Libya had more deaths initially, the protesters were violent from the beginning 
of the movement. Overall there are several lessons that can be learned from the comparison of 
these two events: 
• Interventions are expensive  
• It is difficult to determine which side is the ‘correct’ side 
• Human rights situations may worsen 
• Mission creep can occur 
• History may have better answers 
 
Nations need to understand the full cost and responsibilities of interventions; many of 
them are not easy in and out operations (Dobbins 90). David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister 
at the time, refused to accept any of the post-conflict responsibilities or consequences of 
intervention by asserting, “…this is not about going into a country and knocking over its 
Government, and then owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently” 
(Davidson 325). Many of the coalition states were to afford to assist with the intervention for 
very long. It was estimated in 2012 that the total cost of intervention for the United States was 
close to $896 million, with the European allies owing the U.S. at least $222 million just for U.S. 
air support (Hallams 323).  
In any international situation it is difficult to discern from the outside which side is the 
‘correct’ side. Western media bought into reports that thousands of citizens had been killed, but 
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these reports later turned out to be false (Kuperman “Libya Debacle” 4). Much of the reporting 
also glossed over the fact that the rebels themselves were perpetrating much of the violence 
(Kuperman “Libya Debacle” 3). After the conflict was over, Human Rights Watch documented 
that there were only 233 initial deaths by February 20th, five days after the start of the conflict 
(Kuperman “A Model” 111). By March there had still only been 22 women and 8 children killed 
out of a total of 979 people, showing that Gadhafi’s forces were in fact, being selective because 
women were not a large part of the protests (Kuperman “A Model” 111). These figures were 
backed up by reports by doctors within the country (Kuperman “A Model” 110). Human rights 
violations might have been occurring under the Gadhafi regime but some believe, like Kuperman 
in his 2015 article “Obama’s Libya Debacle”, that Gadhafi’s leadership was more humane than 
the destabilization that followed the NATO intervention (3). It is estimated that 8,000 more 
people died after the NATO strikes, deaths that would not have occurred if Gadhafi had been 
allowed to maintain power (Kuperman “Libya Debacle” 4). This is not to mention the ethnic 
violence that was perpetrated by the victorious rebels (Kuperman “A Model” 125). Rebel groups 
committed retaliation killings, detained supposed Gadhafi supporters and forcefully removed 
roughly 30,000, nearly all black, residents of Tawerga from their homes (Kuperman “A Model” 
125). This caused a diffusion of violence as groups were pushed out of Libya and forced to 
return to their native countries.  
The other risk with interventions is mission creep, adding to the inability of the intervener 
to disengage quickly from the situation. The intervention was supposed to protect citizens from 
imminent threat only (Pattison 3).  However, the coalition was adamant about regime change 
from the beginning (Pattison 4). They then overstepped their mission objectives by firing on 
Gadhafi’s retreating forces (Kuperman “A Model” 113). The coalition also provided weapons 
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and training to the rebels (Kuperman “A Model” 114). Handing out weapons does not create less 
violence; especially not when they are being handed to protesters who were using makeshift 
weapons for the start of the conflict (Kuperman “A Model” 114). Targeted regime change under 
the guise of humanitarian intervention disrespects the sovereignty of the target country, if the 
country’s government does not pose a direct threat to the international community (Reisman 
516). 
Instead of NATO attempting to facilitate a peaceful mediation of the situation, to which 
Gadhafi had tried several times to do, but was rejected each time by the rebels, NATO choose 
intervention immediately (Kuperman “A Model” 114). Gadhafi’s previous behavior suggests that 
sanctions combined with economic/social linkage could have resolved the situation (Levitsky 
and Way 384). Gadhafi had showed response to previous U.N. sanctions in 1999 and 2003, 
working to modernize the economy after the sanctions were lifted (Bruce St. John 99; Kuperman 
“Libya Debacle” 7). Unless a country has never responded to or openly disregards sanction and 
other policy solutions, they should be implemented first and allowed time to work (Pattison 5). 
 Since modernization theory explains why Tunisia was able to peacefully transition and 
Libya was not, policymakers evaluate evolving crisis situations through the modernization theory 
framework before jumping to the conclusion of intervention. Intervention alone does not appear 
to have any impact on a country’s ability to support democracy. Rather, the building blocks that 
form the foundation of democracy must be present and that will not happen overnight or with 
any amount of nation building.  
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Appendix A: Economic Classification Data Extrapolation  
Country Stat 
Code 
High 
Technology 
Exports % of 
Manufactured 
Exports  
GNI, Per 
Capita, 
PPP 
Manufacturing 
% of GDP 
Services 
% of GDP 
Inequality-
Adjusted 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Australia 1 13.5 60,050 6.8 71.9 0.861 
Austria 2 13.4 47,260 18.9 70.4 0.815 
Belgium 3 13.0 44,510 14.3 77.1 0.821 
Bulgaria 4 7.6 7,480  67.3 0.709 
Canada 5 13.8 47,250 10.6 69.3 0.839 
Croatia 6 9.0 12,760 14.7 69.5 0.752 
Cyprus 7 6.2 25,810 6.2 87.2 0.762 
Czech 
Republic 
8 14.9 18,150 14.9 59.7 0.830 
Denmark 9 16.0 60,270 16.0 75.8 0.858 
Estonia 10 11.4 18,320 11.4 69.2 0.788 
Finland 11 8.7 46,560 8.7 70.6 0.843 
France 12 26.8 40,710 26.8 78.8 0.813 
Germany 13 16.7 45,790 16.7 68.9 0.859 
Greece 14 11.0 20,270 11.0 80.2 0.758 
Iceland 15 19.9 50,110 19.9 70.4 0.868 
Ireland 16 7.5 52,550 26.8 57.3 0.850 
Italy 17 7.2 32,830 7.2 74.2 0.784 
Japan 18 16.8 38,840 16.8 73.4 0.791 
Latvia 19 15.0 14,990 15.0 73.7 0.742 
Lithuania 20 11.9 15,080 11.9 66.5 0.759 
Luxembourg 21 6.8 77,480 6.8 87.7 0.827 
Malta 22 31.9 23,900 31.9 82.8 0.786 
Netherlands 23 19.9 48,850 19.9 78.2 0.861 
New Zealand 24 9.6 40,020 9.6 70.9  
Norway 25 20.5 93,530 20.5 63.5 0.898 
Poland 26 8.8 13,310 8.8 63.3 0.774 
Portugal 27 4.4 20,470 4.4 75.4 0.755 
Spain 28 7.1 28,380 7.1 73.8 0.791 
Slovakia 29 10.3 17,570 10.3 61.5 0.793 
Slovenia 30 6.4 22,250 6.4 64.9 0.838 
Sweden 31 14.3 57,900 14.3 72.4 0.851 
Switzerland 32 26.8 84,550 26.8 73.8 0.859 
United 
Kingdom 
33 20.8 43,700 20.8 79.9 0.836 
United States 34 19.0 55,980 19.0 78.0 0.796 
Figure 8: Complied data for all countries listed by the World Bank as developed in 2012, built off data 
from 2015 or 2014 if 2015 was missing. IHDI score are from 2015 data set. Countries with blanks for 
IHDI did not have an IHDI score. http://data.worldbank.org/ 
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 Technology GNI Per Capita Manufacturing % Services %  IHDI 
Minimum 4.40 7480 4.40 57.30 0.709 
Quartile 1 8.43 19783 8.73 68.50 0.7790 
Median 13.20 40365 14.30 72.15 0.815 
Mean 13.73 39044 14.58 72.28 0.81112 
Quartile 3 17.35 50720 19.45 77.33 0.8505 
Maximum 31.90 93530 31.90 87.70 0.898 
IQR 8.93 30938 10.70 8.82 0.0715 
SD 6.57 21398 10.70 7.13 0.04470 
SE Mean 1.13 3670 1.21 1.22 0.00778 
Skew 0.94 0.97 0.67 0.10 -0.25 
Figure 9: Descriptive statistics for developmental indicators 
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